Reconciliation and the Grassroots Green Movement

In the past few days the leaders of the Green Movement have made gestures towards reconciliation with the regime. Karroubi made his now infamous remark that Ahmadinejad may not have been elected, but he is technically the president of the regime. Khatemi wrote his letter proposing dialogue to the Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani did his usual self-serving routine by supporting both sides, saying the Green Movement protestors should be released from jail and dialogue should be a priority, but also saying Khamenei's the only one who can bring unity to the nation.

It seems Mousavi is the only one who hasn't caved even slightly.

With the Green Movement leadership moving towards possible reconciliation with the government, where does that leave the vast numbers of grassroots Greens? So often, the point is emphasized that the Green Movement is incredibly diverse demographically and ideologically, and that it is largely spontaneous in its methods of organizing events. What significance, then, do the leadership have in the hearts of the common Green?

If the leadership begin to cave in too soon, how will the rest of the movement react? Because it is so unstructured, there could be many responses. Here are what I believe to be the three most likely:

1) The Green Movement may well leave these so-called leaders by the wayside if popular opinion feels that they capitulated too quickly or in the wrong way. After all, at this point the Greens have realized that it isn't politicians who hold the power in this crisis, it's popular will, at least inasmuch as mass protests and widespread anti-government sentiment have completely de-legitimized Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. If they are unafraid to chant "Death to Khamenei," it wouldn't be a stretch for them to marginalize Green politicians similarly.

2) Although the Green Movement has no hierarchy, the gestures towards reconciliation with the government may be supported by the Movement's followers, most of whom place reform as their priority rather than outright revolution against the system.

3) A split. Some Greens follow the compromise set out by their leaders, and others radicalize and engage in more extremist action than simply protesting.

Khamenei has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the Green Movement, as the various slogans against him shouted at every protest demonstrate. Thus, when "reformist" politicians talk about his role in bringing unity back to Iran, I truly wonder if they realize how reviled Khamenei is by most of the Green Movement at this point. To compromise with him will likely invalidate any claims of these politicians to represent the Green Movement.

It is too premature to say that Karroubi and Mousavi will compromise, but Khatemi and Rafsanjani have already thrown their lot in with the moderates. Then again, reformists lost hope in either of them a long time ago. Mousavi and Karroubi, however, have shown no inclination to capitulate, but are willing to engage in talks if their basic demands are addressed. Nevertheless, the impression I'm getting since Ashura is that the Green Movement has much stronger demands (perhaps the removal of Khamenei, or of the position of Supreme Leader altogether?) than even Mousavi and Karroubi have vocalized.

We'll have to wait and see in the next few days what leaders on both sides will say. I'll be watching closely to see Mousavi's reaction to all the talk of "reconciliation," and the Green Movement's reaction to his reaction.